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Misunderstandings of ethnic identities in Rakhine as fixed and biological are leading to 
policy errors by the Government of Myanmar and NGOs on the ground in Rakhine  
(Professor Michael W. Charney, 4 July 2018) 
 
Introduction to the problem 
 
Since 1962, military governments and the current 
government of Myanmar have promoted a national 
identity built on an exclusivist, Bamar, ethno-
nationalism defined around unscientific, 
nineteenth century Orientalist notions of race. On 
the basis of these ideas codified in the 1982 
citizenship laws which did not include Rohingya as 
a Taingyintha (national race), the Rohingya have 
been stripped of citizenship or realistic hopes of 
citizenship. These moves were paralleled by 
attempts by the Tatmadaw in 1978, 1990-91, and 
2017 to force the Rohingya permanently out of 
Rakhine into Bangladesh as part of what might best 
be called the ‘western wall’ project. The underlying 
idea is that Rakhine was a vulnerable space on the 
Burma frontier through which influences held to be 
foreign by Bamar Buddhist ultranationalists, such as 
Islam, would corrupt Burma and Burmese 
Buddhism. Rohingya were treated incorrectly as 
evidence of mass illegal immigration rather than 
the historical influence of Islam and Bengali 
material culture in a land that was at the overlap of 
two cultural zones. The August 2017 expulsion of 
750,000 Rohingya as the final part of the Tatmadaw 
western wall project is what Tatmadaw 
commander General Min Aung Hlaing has 
characterised as his “final solution” to the 
“problem.” Despite agreements and promises 
made, Myanmar is unlikely to take back the 
overwhelming majority of Rohingya refugees 
without significant international pressure.  
 
A Religiously and Ethnically Inclusive history 
 
In Southeast Asia, work by Lieberman, Scott, and 
others has demonstrated that ethnic and religious 
identities in Burma, historically, also reflect the 
political circumstances of their time and can be 
chosen or forced upon someone depending on the 
situation. In the Irrawaddy Valley, identifying 
oneself as Burman or Mon in the 1740s and 1750s 
depended not upon one’s language or culture but 
on whether they were subject to or allied with the 
court at Ava (Burmans) or the court at Pegu (Mon) 
during their war with each other (1740-1756). 
Many Burmans today are the descendants of 
Manipuri, Thai, and Lao captives carried into the 
Irrawaddy valley by wars of conquest. Likewise, 
research in DNA in the region although equivocal in 
many ways suggests that centuries of aggression by 
various precolonial Burmese states has had a major 
genetic impact on populations in Yunnan, Thailand, 
India, and Bangladesh. At the same time, centuries 
of slave-raiding by the Rakhine court at Mrauk-U 
meant that by the 18th century, 75% of the 
population of Rakhine, regardless of religion, was of 
Bengali origin. 
Genetic or regional origin was unrelated to 
religious conversion. Theravada Buddhism and 
Islam were introduced to Rakhine in the late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries ion a 
significant scale in the royal capital. Over the course 
of the next few hundred years, both Islam and 
Buddhism spread to Bengali captive communities 
and to free villages in the southern part of the 
kingdom. The same families probably included 
branches that were Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim, 
and extended family networks extended across the 
Naf River. Language and material culture probably 
extended over Buddhist and Muslim families on the 
basis of geography, anyone living in northern 
Rakhine more influenced by Bengal and anyone in 
southern Rakhine influenced by the Irrawaddy 
Valley, Rohingya speakers in the north and Burmese 
speakers in the south. We know that many of the 
prominent Buddhist Rakhine of the colonial period 
and some Rakhine Buddhist leaders today came 
from families that were based at Cox’s Bazaar 
before the British conquest of Rakhine in 1824-26. 
On the ground, in everyday life, most Rakhine 
and Rohingya probably did not care very much 
about these ethnic identities that were so discrete 
and absolute on paper, but covered communities 
that were intermarried over the course of the five 
centuries of history that they shared. Families 
included Burmese and Rohingya speakers, 
extended up and down the coast from Chittagong 
to Akyab (Sittwe) and down to Sandoway. 
 
Divisions Between Communities 
 
Ethno-religious communalism in Rakhine is of very 
recent origin. Religious affiliation had made a 
transition to community identity in the colonial 
period when the court and its officials was no 
longer around to manage local communities and 
local headmen had become agents of a distant and 
indifferent colonial state.  
British rule also transformed the Rakhine 
people by essentializing the Rakhine Buddhists as 
indigenous sons of the soil and Muslims as foreign 
immigrants. Nineteenth-century Orientalist 
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scholarship conflated notions of ethnicity with 
those of nation. Ethnicity in this older view 
incorporated cultural, linguistic, behavioural 
patterns, and a shared history that were essentially 
organic and fixed and, in political terms, formed the 
foundation of the nation. In colonial eyes and 
records, people fell into one or another category 
with particular and static linguistic, cultural, and 
racial features. 
Over the following decades, the British 
identified the Rohingya as a singular ethnic 
category wrongly as a foreign presence peculiar to 
the time of their acquisition of the colony in 1826. 
The British Census for India from 1871 identified 
local Muslims by their language, which they 
grouped together with Bengali, divided the 
Rohingya into two parts, those that spoke 
predominantly Rohingya became Bengali speakers, 
Indians, and immigrants and those who spoke 
predominantly one or another dialect of Rakhine 
became Rakhine speakers, Burmese, and 
indigenous. Religious membership was then 
applied to each group, the first included within the 
category Muslims and the latter as Buddhists. 
Buddhist monks from Southern Rakhine seem 
to have played a leading role in claiming an 
exclusively Buddhist past for Rakhine. Particularly 
from the 1820s and 1830s Buddhist monks tried to 
produce histories for the Rakhine Buddhists who 
returned to Rakhine from Bangladesh in the First 
Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) that claimed for 
them an exclusive Buddhist past, that de-
emphasized elements of Islam, Bengali culture, and 
non-Burmese languages that had characterised 
much of early modern Rakhine. When, popular 
political and related anxiety between communities 
was artificially developed in the political anti-
colonial fervour of the 1920s, Sandamalinkaya 
collated these histories into a Rakhine Buddhist 
chronicle of chronicles that saw mass circulation via 
a modern printing press.   
The 1930s saw a flurry of available identities in 
the region. Different futures, alternative political 
imaginaries, were invented, debated, argued for, 
and written about. Rakhine Buddhists were 
sometimes Burmese nationalists, unitary 
nationalists, or regionalists and so too were the 
Rohingya, but some, in both camps, also sought 
religious alliance with co-religionists in Sri Lanka 
(the Buddhists) or Bengal and India (the Muslims). 
The Japanese support for unbridled Burmese 
Buddhist nationalism in their invasion of Burma in 
1942 saw the attack and massacre by some Bamars 
of Muslim villagers in Rakhine and retaliatory 
attacks on Burmese speaking Buddhist villagers by 
Muslims, fostering greater tension between both 
communities. 
The years between 1948 and 1962 saw an 
eclipse of religious communal problems in Rakhine. 
The Rohingya successfully resisted separatists who 
favoured union with Pakistan in the early 1950s, 
anxiety between the communities subsided if it did 
not disappear altogether, and the Burmese 
government recognised the Rohingya as Burmese 
indigenous ethnics, as nationals, and as citizens. 
This would change from 1962. 
 
The Current Debate and Political Impasse 
 
Current anthropology understands ethnicities in 
cultural and dynamic terms and increasingly 
abandoned any association with human biology or 
notions of race. Particularly, from the 1960s and 
1970s, ethnic membership was something that 
people chose to be part of, sometimes for a lifetime 
and sometimes alternatively depending upon 
different contexts. Ethnic identities themselves are 
not static and organic in nature, but artificial, 
constructed, and in their contemporary 
manifestations quite recent in time. People have 
varying degrees of subscription to them.  
A few Western scholars (Leider, De Mersan) and 
private individuals (Tonkin) having relied upon 
colonial records for understanding the Rohingya, 
unfortunately misinterpreted ethnic identities in 
ways that reflect nineteenth century Orientalist 
notions and not contemporary understandings. 
Burmese scholars rely similarly on the state of 
anthropology from the 1930s. Both sources have 
misunderstood indigeneity in Rakhine as 
synonymous with a static Rakhine Buddhist ethnic 
identity. These views lend undue legitimacy to the 
Tatmadaw’s actions in Rakhine and the Myanmar 
government’s policies against the Rohingya. 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. The Rohingya should be considered and treated 
as being as indigenous as any other group to the 
Rakhine region of Myanmar. 
 
2. The Rohingya must be returned to their ancestral 
homeland in Rakhine, Myanmar completely in a 
dignified manner, one that respects their historical 
claims to the region. 
 
3. Until current outdated understandings of 
ethnicity have changed in the Myanmar military 
and government, Rohingya safety necessitates a 
protected homeland within Rakhine, Myanmar. 
 
